The Trump Administration and U.S.–Russian Relations by Csizmazia, Gábor
Vol. 18, No. 1 (2019) 21–38.
21
DOI: 10.32565/aarms.2019.1.2
The Trump Administration  
and U.S.–Russian Relations1
Gábor CSIZMAZIA2
President Trump’s controversial foreign policy performance, particularly in relation 
to Russia, raises the question of his administration’s stance towards U.S.–Russian 
relations. While the President has displayed initial intentions of reaching out to 
Moscow, his administration’s overall view of the world sets U.S.–Russian relations 
in a competition-based framework. This “global arena” perspective is reflected in 
official national security policy documents and by major foreign policy decision-
makers as well. Thus the Trump Administration not only maintains its predecessor’s 
initiatives countering Russia but enhances them by further emphasizing deterrence 
and containment measures in Europe through an increased European Deterrence 
Initiative (EDI) budget, addressing Russian violation of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and arming Ukraine with lethal defensive weapons.
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Introduction
The Trump Administration’s foreign policy performance has been an issue of debate 
among scholars of international relations and by the general public alike. The tone and 
decisions of the 45th President of the United States—especially when compared to that 
of his predecessor—are controversial, and his stance towards Russia is no different. On 
the one hand, President Trump is under constant fire of accusations due to the alleged 
collusion between his election campaign team and the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential elections. In addition to his suggestions on trying to mend relations with Russia, 
his remarks on the scope of Russian meddling did not help his situation in mainstream 
media or Congress. For example, in early 2018 the Editorial Board of The Washington Post 
described the President’s behavior in the matter inappropriate and called on the legislative 
branch to fill the void of absent presidential leadership. [1] In other words, at home President 
Trump is in a politically weak position to form his own Russia policy. On the other hand, 
the Trump Administration has preserved several of its predecessor’s initiatives in addressing 
Russia’s assertive foreign policy. In fact, it has gone further on this road, enhancing some of 
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PACSDOP-2.1.2-CCMOP-15-2016-00001 entitled “Public Service Development Establishing Good 
Governance”.
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these measures quantitatively and qualitatively alike. These include the continuing targeted 
U.S. sanctions against Russian individuals, the authorization of sending lethal weapons to 
Ukraine, and ordering air strikes against the Kremlin-endorsed Assad regime for allegedly 
using chemical weapons against civilians in Syria. [2] It is without doubt that U.S.–Russian 
relations have not improved at all thus far under the Trump presidency. The aim of this 
article is to examine the driving factors behind the Trump Administration’s position on 
U.S.–Russian relations. The analysis reviews external (inherited) factors and internal actors 
(administration team), highlighting the policy outputs through concrete examples.
The Outside World as It Is
In order to understand the Trump Administration’s stance towards Russia, it is necessary 
to set it into context and examine Washington’s view of the international environment and 
particularly U.S.–Russian relations. The latter has re-occurred several times on the high 
end of the post-Cold War American foreign policy agenda with each president at the time 
having tried (and ultimately failed) to establish lasting good bilateral relations. As a result, 
the bilateral relationship has displayed fluctuations. This article does not intend to map up 
the history of the post-Cold War U.S.–Russian relationship in its entirety but to highlight its 
characteristics that emerged by the time the Trump Administration took office.
President Obama’s Turn from Partnership to Deterrence
Washington’s most recent serious attempt to cooperate with Moscow was made by the Obama 
Administration in 2009. The “reset” with Russia was rooted in President Obama’s view 
of the international environment. Barack Obama was regarded by some to have a more 
realist view of the world than his predecessor. While the realist nature of President Obama’s 
foreign policy is debatable,3 it is clear that he tried to look at the world as it is. Firstly, his 
administration recognized that that the “international architecture that was largely forged 
in the wake of World War II is buckling under the weight of new threats”. [4: 40] This went 
hand in hand with the other realization, namely that while America is in fact the leader of 
this international order, its power is limited.4 Secondly, this acknowledgment was primarily 
true in case of global challenges which the Obama Administration was most concerned 
with. President Obama’s 2010 national security strategy characterized the United States’ 
strategic environment with threats, risks and challenges of a “global age” such as: violent 
extremism, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (which 
it considered to be the gravest danger to America), challenges in space and cyberspace, 
dependence on fossil fuels and climate change, failing states and global criminal networks, 
as well as the economic inequalities of globalization. Another attribute of the global 
landscape was that new and emerging powers (including Russia and China) were gaining 
3 For an overview of President Obama’s realist-like instincts but the lack of realist worldview, see Stephen M. 
Walt’s article “Obama Was Not a Realist President” published in Foreign Policy in April 2016. [3]
4 “In an interconnected world, there are no global problems that can be solved without the United States, and 
few that can be solved by the United States alone.” [5: 3]
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influence. [4: 8] These recognitions led the Obama presidency to try to build partnerships 
addressing these global challenges and at the same time to shape a “just and sustainable 
international order” that represent “the diffusion of influence in the 21st century.”5  [4: 12] It is 
important to emphasize, however, that the Obama Administration did not want to dismantle 
the international system let alone discard America’s role of leadership. This is a crucial 
point, as it reveals the conceptual differences between the respective world views of 
the White House and the Kremlin. While the Obama Administration pursued a cooperation-
oriented multi-partner world that would replace the competition-based multi-polar one,6 
the Medvedev/Putin Administration was hanging on to the latter before7 and after President 
Obama’s term in office alike. [8] Hence this fundamental divergence in views existed in 
parallel to all of the accomplishments of the “reset” with Russia.
President Obama’s national security team knew about the presence of inter-state 
competition in the world but thought that other global players would share their analysis 
of the international environment: specifically, the Obama Administration took the liberal 
view of international competition being “self-defeating” with defectors being punished by 
exclusion from the opportunities of cooperation.8 In other words, Washington assumed that 
common global challenges will lead to common ground with others who would have no real 
interest in competition. This was also thought of Russia. Expecting “win–win” situations,9 
President Obama emphasized the incentive of Russia being a responsible great power in 
the international system and his hope of the “reset” bringing a lasting qualitative change 
in bilateral relations.10 At the same time, the Obama White House was not entirely naïve. It 
was aware of the above mentioned dissent in American and Russian world views, as well 
5 “The test of this international order must be the cooperation it facilitates and the results it 
generates – the ability of nations to come together to confront common challenges like violent extremism, 
nuclear proliferation, climate change, and a changing global economy.” [4: 12] 
6 As U.S. Secretary of State (2009–2013) Hillary R. Clinton noted in July 2009: “In short, we will lead by 
inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance 
away from a multi-polar world and toward a multi-partner world.” [6] 
7 As Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov wrote in May 2007: “Russia has restored its foreign-
policy independence – as a sovereign democratic state. Thus, for the first time in many years, a real 
competitive environment has emerged on the market of ideas for the future world order that are compatible 
with the present stage of global development. The establishment of new global centers of influence and 
growth, a more balanced distribution of resources for development, and control over natural wealth, represent 
the foundation for a multipolar world order.” [7: 13–14]
8 “Even though many defining trends of the 21st century affect all nations and peoples, too often, the mutual 
interests of nations and peoples are ignored in favor of suspicion and self-defeating competition. […] And 
when national interests do collide […] those nations that defy international norms or fail to meet their 
sovereign responsibilities will be denied of the incentives that come with greater integration and collaboration 
with the international community.” [4: 40] 
9 Speaking in Moscow in March 2011, Vice-President Joseph R. Biden said he believed in “‘win–win’ 
situations” […] [and rejected] the tired theory that our values and our interests must compete for influence 
over our politics.” [9] 
10 President Obama said in 2009 in Moscow that global “challenges demand global partnership, and that 
partnership will be stronger if Russia occupies its rightful place as a great power. Yet unfortunately, there 
is sometimes a sense that old assumptions must prevail, old ways of thinking; a conception of power that is 
rooted in the past rather than in the future. […] These assumptions are wrong. In 2009, a great power does not 
show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries. The days when empires could treat sovereign 
states as pieces on a chess board are over. […] The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game – progress 
must be shared. That’s why I have called for a ‘reset’ in relations between the United States and Russia. This 
must be more than a fresh start between the Kremlin and the White House.” [10]
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as of Russian tendencies for assertiveness—after all, it took office right after U.S.–Russian 
relations had cooled down due to the 2008 Russo–Georgian War. It did warn the Kremlin 
that while the “reset” offers great opportunities for achieving common goals in nuclear 
arms reduction, economic cooperation, and the fight against terrorism, it is not a trade-
off in which Washington would be easy on Moscow’s possible violation of international 
norms and principles. Moreover, the Obama Administration’s liberal stance was also felt 
in its willingness to stand up for political reforms and against human rights violations in 
Russia.11 This ultimately led to the deterioration of bilateral relations during Russia’s 2011 
parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections. The Ukraine crisis obviously worsened 
the situation. President Obama introduced a set of financial economic sanctions against 
Russian individuals in accordance with its aforementioned world view that offenders of 
the international order need to be punished. His 2015 national security strategy continued to 
value partnerships for addressing global challenges while calling for a U.S.-led international 
order championed by most countries. At the same time, it acknowledged that “in many 
cases […] coercive measures are meant not only to uphold international norms, but to 
deter severe threats to stability and order at the regional level.” [5: 23] Thus by the end 
of the Obama presidency, U.S. efforts to conform eastern European allies have formally 
turned from the latter group’s re-assurance to the deterrence against Russia.12 The Obama 
Administration’s second national security strategy also declared that “power among states 
is more dynamic”, adding that Russia’s aggression will “significantly impact the future of 
major power relations”. [5: 4] This was a moderate statement compared to that of the Trump 
Administration on this subject but it revealed that Washington’s more emphasized view on 
power struggles began to take shape.
President Trump’s Global Arena of Competition
Throughout the 2016 presidential election campaign, Donald J. Trump made a series of 
outspoken statements on what he believed to be the failures of the American foreign policy 
after the Cold War. [11] His foreign policy turn within his “America First” campaign was 
named “principled realism” which gave a heavy weight to the realist themes of power 
and national interests in President Trump’s 2017 national security strategy.13 The Trump 
Administration’s hitherto adherence to realist concepts is debatable,14 nevertheless, it clearly 
11 In his aforementioned speech, Vice President Biden reminded that addressing Russian domestic issues are 
“necessary to have a good relationship […] [and that Washington] will continue to object when […] human 
rights are violated or democracy and the rule of law is undermined [in Russia].” [9]
12 The Obama Administration’s European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) was announced in June 2014. In addition 
to conforming Eastern European allies, it was also meant to increase deterrence against Russian aggression. 
The latter aspect received further emphasis by the summer of 2016 while the budget for FY 2017 already 
mentioned European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).
13 “This strategy is guided by principled realism. It is realist because it acknowledges the central role of power in 
international politics, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines 
our national interests. It is principled because it is grounded in the knowledge that advancing American 
principles spreads peace and prosperity around the globe.” [12: 55] 
14 As Stephen M. Walt highlighted, while some of the President’s ideas (such as mending relations with Russia, 
reforming international trade arrangements, and adjusting the transatlantic burden-sharing in defense) do have 
rational foundation, their execution has been counterproductive. [13]
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has a more competition focused mindset than its predecessor. Nadia Schadlow, leading 
author of the 2017 national security strategy document, for example, indicated in early 2017 
that American diplomacy was still not fully aware of the essence of the political competition 
present in the world.15 When explaining the concept of “America First”, Lt. Gen. Herbert 
Raymond McMaster, President Trump’s National Security Advisor (2017–2018) and Gary 
David Cohn Director of the National Economic Council (2017–2018) at the time reminded 
that the administration has “a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a ‘global community’ 
but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for 
advantage”. [15] This, they emphasized, does not mean that America is alone, as the Trump 
Administration also intends to rely on partners and international institutions. However, 
it is noticeable that these institutions are primarily meant to serve U.S. national interests 
and although Washington is open to reform them, it also retains the option of a selective 
approach in such engagements.16 In fact, the Trump Administration concluded that some 
of the international institutions have proven to be ineffective in transforming other major 
powers (such as China and Russia) into cooperative partners.17 This means that the earlier 
concept of ultimate democratic peace through inclusive engagement of countries has 
failed.18 Instead, the Trump team states that “a central continuity in history is the contest 
for power” and that “geopolitics is the interplay of these contests [over influence] across 
the globe”, [12: 25–26] leading to the return of great power competition. The 2018 U.S. 
national defense strategy outright says that with the United States “emerging from a period 
of strategic atrophy, […] facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in 
the long-standing rules-based international order […] inter-state competition, not terrorism, 
is now the primary concern in U.S. national security”. [16: 1]
The 2017 U.S. national security strategy confirms the Obama Administration’s view 
that China and Russia are becoming more assertive, but at the same time it goes further 
and openly declares that they are revisionist powers “contesting [the United States’] 
geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor”. [12: 27] 
The Obama Administration’s 2015 national security strategy came to the same conclusion 
15 “The Trump administration has an opportunity to build up what we lack: the capacity to engage these long 
term political competitions. […] Today, the word ‘compete’ is rare in State Department strategy documents. 
The new team has an opportunity to develop approaches to counter adversaries, convince the undecided, and 
influence the competitions unfolding all over the world.” [14]
16 “The United States must lead and engage in the multinational arrangements that shape many of the rules that 
affect U.S. interests and values. A competition for influence exists in these institutions. As we participate in 
them, we must protect American sovereignty and advance American interests and values. […] All institutions 
are not equal, however. The United States will prioritize its efforts in those organizations that serve American 
interests, to ensure that they are strengthened and supportive of the United States, our allies, and our 
partners. […] If the United States is asked to provide a disproportionate level of support for an institution, we 
will expect a commensurate degree of influence over the direction and efforts of that institution.” [12: 40]
17 “Thee competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades – policies based 
on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global 
commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned 
out to be false.” [12: 3]
18 “Since the 1990s, the United States displayed a great degree of strategic complacency. We assumed that our 
military superiority was guaranteed and that a democratic peace was inevitable. We believed that liberal-
democratic enlargement and inclusion would fundamentally alter the nature of international relations and that 
competition would give way to peaceful cooperation.” [12: 27]
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but expressed it in a more restrained way.19 The Trump Administration is more outspoken 
on the respective rise and aggression of China and Russia who (along with others) have also 
changed the “character of competition” by “operating below the threshold of open military 
conflict and at the edges of international law” in order to covertly and gradually reach their 
goals, and ultimately “over time, a new status quo”.20 [12: 27–28] Thus the competition 
between the United State and Russia exists on a wide scale ranging from the spheres of 
military, economy and technology, to politics and public opinion. Accordingly, Russian 
efforts to counter U.S. (and Western) influence are visible in its military—especially nuclear 
weapons—development programs, cyber attacks against and subversions within other 
countries’ domestic political affairs. The Trump team shares the Obama Administration’s 
views that Russia is using economic tools—particularly Europe’s energy dependence—for 
increasing its political influence. [5: 5] [12: 38] Moreover, while Russia perceives the U.S. 
and the EU as threats, [12: 25–26] the competition affects other regions as well, including 
the Middle East.21 All of this, however, does not mean that the Trump Administration intends 
to completely isolate Russia. Similarly to his predecessors, President Trump signaled his 
intent to find areas of joint cooperation, should Russia change course. [12: 25]
Actors and Decisions
The recent chill in U.S.–Russian relations is felt through various issues including the war 
in Syria. After President Trump announced coordinated air strikes against the Syrian 
Government’s facilities on the 14th of April 2018 as a punishment for a chemical attack 
in the country the week before, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki R. Haley indicated 
the future introduction of a new set of sanctions against Russia for supporting the Syrian 
regime. Director of the National Economic Council Lawrence A. Kudlow denied this, 
saying that Ambassador Haley’s incorrect statement was due to her “momentary confusion”. 
This caused a minor inter-administration clash with Ambassador Haley remarking: “With 
all due respect, I don’t get confused.” Although this public dissent turned out to be 
a misunderstanding caused by a communication error, [17] it does raise the question how 
members of the Trump Administration—more specifically within the National Security 
Council—view the U.S. policy on Russia. Therefore, in order to understand the latter, 
the respective positions of major U.S. foreign policy decision-making actors, as well as 
the rationale behind some of the administration’s decisions are worthy of review.
19 “As the balance of economic power changes, so do expectations about influence over international affairs. 
Shifting power dynamics create both opportunities and risks for cooperation, as some states have been 
more willing than others to assume responsibilities commensurate with their greater economic capacity. In 
particular, India’s potential, China’s rise, and Russia’s aggression all significantly impact the future of major 
power relations.” [5: 4]
20 “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.” [12: 25]
21 As Nadia Schadlow argues, “the Middle East is in turmoil due not only to the assault of Islamist terrorist 
organizations, but also due to a regional competition among Iran, Arab states, Turkey, Russia, and 
the West”. [14] 
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The President’s National Security Team
Ever since his election campaign, Donald Trump’s views on Russia have been controversial. 
On the one hand, it was clear already before the election that the Trump team was the overall 
beneficiary of Russian interferences in the campaign which were directed against Hillary 
R. Clinton who was considered to be more hawkish with regards to Russia. Reports in 
mainstream media also emphasized Trump businesses having ties to pro-Kremlin Russian 
financiers. [18] Eventually, allegations of the Trump team’s collusion with foreign (Russian) 
actors triggered an official investigation by ex-FBI Director Robert S. Mueller as special 
counsel. While the investigation is pursued in the background, mainstream media—having 
a mutually sour relationship with President Trump—keeps the issue on high display thus 
maintaining domestic pressure on the White House. On the other hand, Donald Trump has 
championed the idea of mending bilateral relations “from a position of strength”. [11]22 This 
is mandated by his policies on “America First” and “peace through strength” but also driven 
by Congress which has quickly limited the President’s space of maneuver by enacting 
President Obama’s executive orders on earlier sanctions against Russian individuals 
thus making it impossible for President Trump to withdraw them without the legislative 
branch’s support. What makes the President’s position on the subject more controversial is 
his communications: though he adheres to the strong policies against Russia, he often shows 
reluctance.23
The President’s mixed views on the relationship with Russia can be counterbalanced 
by the foreign and security policy decision-making actors surrounding him. Key among 
them is the National Security Advisor. President Trump’s first National Security Advisor 
Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn (2017) was forced out of his job very early precisely due to his 
proximity to—and background negotiations with—Russian actors. [21] While the President 
showed mixed views on the issue,24 his second National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. H. R. 
McMaster (2017–2018) was clearer and more open about Russia. Already under the Obama 
Administration, Lt. Gen. McMaster, as Head of the U.S. Army Capabilities Integration 
Center, proposed a study on Russia’s new generation of warfare. In his April 2016 testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he indicated that while the U.S. was tied 
down in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Russia studied U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities and 
embarked on an ambitious and largely successful modernization effort” to which the U.S. 
Army should adapt, as well. [22] Similarly, as National Security Advisor, he declared that 
“Russia is engaged in a very sophisticated campaign of subversion to affect our confidence 
22 “Now, again, maybe I’m not going to be able to do a deal with Russia, but at least I will have tried. And if I 
don’t, does anybody really think that Hillary Clinton would be tougher on Russia than Donald Trump? Does 
anybody in this room really believe that?” [19]
23 In case of the enacted sanctions known as the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act”, 
President Trump published a signing statement in which he called the piece of legislation “significantly 
flawed”, as it constrains his power as President. [20]
24 Although President Trump did ask for the resignation of Lt. Gen. Flynn, shortly after the latter’s secret 
dealing with other (including Russian) diplomats came to light, he did not disapprove his actions, only 
the fact that the National Security Advisor did not truthfully inform the Vice-President about the discussions. 
As the President said: “Mike [Flynn] was doing his job. He was calling countries and his counterparts. So it 
certainly would have been okay with me if he did it. I would have directed him to do it if I thought he wasn’t 
doing it. I didn’t direct him but I would have directed him because that’s his job.” [19]
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in democratic institutions, in democratic processes” and thereby creating divisions within 
Western societies. [23] However, Russia turned out to be one of the collision issues25 between 
the President and the National Security Advisor who left office in March 2018. After his 
departure from the White House, Lt. Gen. McMaster noted that the United States has “failed 
to impose sufficient costs” on Russia. [25] President Trump’s new National Security Advisor, 
former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John R. Bolton shares his predecessor’s thoughts on 
Russian intent to divide the American society through its interference in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, as well as the idea that hitherto U.S. reactions should be intensified 
into “decidedly disproportionate”26 retaliation. He also argued that due to the mainstream 
media’s pressure on the President and his campaign collusion with Russian actors, “the 
Trump administration has neither developed nor deployed a coherent Russia policy”. [26]
Similarly to President Trump, his first Secretary of State, Rex W. Tillerson (2017–2018) 
was initially regarded as one with mixed views on Russia. On the one hand, his ties to Russia 
were clear from the start: as CEO of ExxonMobil, he received the Order of Friendship 
medal by Russian President Vladimir V. Putin in 2013 for the company’s 2011 investment in 
the Russian territories of the Arctic. While the project suffered from the post-2014 sanctions, 
Mr. Tillerson was head of ExxonMobil until joining the Trump Administration which made 
him a target for inquiries on financial and economic interests in Russia. On the other hand, his 
business career was regarded as a proof of aptitude, as he had rallied a group of ex-diplomats 
and geopolitical experts for his advisory team at ExxonMobil. [27] Yet as Secretary of State, 
he struggled with his department which was under the blade of financial and personnel cuts. 
In fact, the Trump Administration has had a tendency to downgrade diplomacy and thereby 
the importance of Secretary Tillerson in foreign policy decision-making. In the meantime, 
he became more and more critical concerning Russia. Already during his congressional 
hearing for the post, Rex Tillerson called for a “clear-eyed” relationship with a Russia 
that “poses a danger, but it is not unpredictable in advancing its own interest”. Similarly 
to President Trump, he identified the source of the problem in weak American leadership 
and urged a “frank dialogue” between the two countries. [28: 6]27 By the end of 2017, 
his position moved closer to the mainstream U.S. views on Russia, and he reminded that 
“absent a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine situation [i.e. the restoration of the country’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity], […] there cannot be business as usual with Russia. [29] 
25 For example, President Trump criticized the National Security Advisor for one of his public remarks on 
Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, downplaying the Russian involvement’s 
importance regarding the outcome of the election. [24]
26 As John Bolton noted in an opinion article a couple of months before his appointment of National Security 
Advisor: “We need to create structures of deterrence in cyberspace, as we did with nuclear weapons […] 
One way to do that is to engage in a retaliatory cyber campaign against Russia. This effort should not be 
proportional to what we have just experienced. it should be decidedly disproportionate.” [26]
27 “Our NATO allies are right to be alarmed at a resurgent Russia. But it was the absence of American leadership 
that his door was left open and unintended signals were sent. We backtracked on commitments we made to 
allies. We sent weak or mixed signals with ‘red lines’ that turned into green lights. We did not recognize that 
Russia does not think like we do. Words alone do not sweep away an uneven and at times contentious history 
between our two nations. But we need an open and frank dialogue with Russia regarding its ambitions, so that 
we know how to chart our own course.” [28: 6]
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Since Tillerson’s final statement as Secretary of State was a condemnation of Russia,28 his 
removal from the Trump Administration increased the media’s and the opposition’s suspicion 
of President Trump being too soft on the Kremlin. [30] However, President Trump’s new 
appointee, former CIA Director Michael R. Pompeo is considered to be a hardliner when it 
comes to Russia: already in his congressional hearing for his position at the CIA, Mr. Pompeo 
argued that: “Russia has reasserted itself aggressively, invading and occupying Ukraine, 
threatening Europe, and doing nearly nothing to aid in the destruction of ISIS.” [31: 4] 
Similarly, in his opening statement of his congressional hearing for the position of Secretary 
of State, he emphasized that: “President Trump’s national security strategy, rightfully, has 
identified Russia as a danger to [the United States].” [32: 10] Mr. Pompeo is regarded to 
have a better personal relationship with the President than his predecessor had, yet it is 
currently a question whether this would play a decisive role in guiding the President on 
Russia.
Compared to the aforementioned actors, the Secretary of Defense seems to have a stabile 
position in President Trump’s administration. General James N. Mattis already revealed 
a fraction of the Trump Administration’s assessment of the international environment in an 
August 2016 article he co-wrote with fellows at the Hoover Institution, arguing that the world 
has become more dangerous as a result of “20 years of the United States operating unguided 
by strategy” and that Russia (along with China, Iran and terrorists groups) have assaulted 
the international order. [33] In his congressional hearing for the top position in the Pentagon, 
General Mattis said that the most important thing is to “recognize that [Vladimir Putin] is 
trying to break the North Atlantic Alliance”, adding that the actions of Russia—along with 
that of China and terrorist groups—represent “the biggest attack [on the post-WWII order] 
since World War II” and thus calling for U.S. deterrence. [34: 41] The U.S. commitment 
to NATO’s cohesion is a significant indicator of former Secretary Mattis’ efforts to guide 
the President in foreign and security policy. In contrast to Donald Trump’s harsh statement 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign that the transatlantic alliance is 
“obsolete”, General Mattis has regarded NATO as “the most successful military alliance 
probably in modern world history and maybe ever” [34: 56] and has intended to emphasize 
this view to the President29—in which he ultimately succeeded (based on President Trump’s 
later statements). As for the bilateral relationship with Russia, General Mattis did not 
reject the re-occurring idea of cooperation with Moscow on specific issues while having 
disagreements in other areas, however, he also noted that there are fewer opportunities 
for the former and more cases for the latter given that Russia “has chosen to be a strategic 
28 Regarding the assassination attempt against former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in 
the United Kingdom, Secretary Tillerson called Russia “an irresponsible force of instability in the world, 
acting with open disregard for the sovereignty of other states and the life of their citizens”. After President 
Trump removed Rex Tillerson from office, U.S. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi noted that “Secretary 
Tillerson’s firing sets a profoundly disturbing precedent in which standing up for our allies against Russian 
aggression is grounds for a humiliating dismissal”. [30]
29 “I have had discussions with [Mr. Trump] on this issue. He has shown himself open even to the point of 
asking more questions, going deeper into the issue about why I feel so strongly. And he understands where 
I stand, and I will work with the other members of the national security team […] to carry these views 
forward.” [34: 57]
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competitor”. [34: 45]30 At the same time, Secretary Mattis was considered to be a voice 
of reason within the Trump team, advocating consistency in U.S. engagements (including 
military operations) throughout the world and cautioning the President in tense situations 
with Iran or North Korea.31 While Gen. Mattis intended to utilize President Trump’s increase 
in the U.S. defense budget to prepare the armed forces for a potential conflict with Russia or 
China, [35] his caution of confronting the former was clear.32
Actions of Deterrence
Throughout its first year the Trump Administration has made several steps directed against 
Russia in one way or another. These included the maintenance of economic pressure 
through sanctions against individuals, as well as cutting back diplomatic relations through 
the expelling of Russian diplomats. However, these were only reactions to specific Russian 
deeds. Considering the notion that the aforementioned competition with great power rivals 
manifests in various regions, the U.S stance towards NATO and its eastern flank serves as 
a more persistent benchmark of how the Trump Administration engages vis-à-vis Russia. 
In addition to promoting “a strong and free Europe”, [12: 47] the Trump Administration 
is particularly attentive concerning “unfavorable shifts” in “regional balances” between 
the U.S. and other great powers.33 Hence it intensified efforts aimed at deterring Russia in 
Europe, starting with a galvanized position on the issue of burden sharing within NATO. 
Donald Trump made several statements on U.S. dissatisfaction with the fact that most 
European members of the alliance are not paying enough on national defense and thus are 
(almost) free riders of Article 5 primarily assured by the United States. These included 
unconventional announcements such as having U.S. commitment to collective defense 
depend on whether the given member states actually spend 2% of their respective GDP on 
defense, as well as emphasizing the importance of the latter during his first attendance at 
a NATO summit while neglecting to mention America’s commitment to Article 5 at all. 
Such comments received overall negative reactions, yet there are two things that should 
be noted on the subject (apart from the fact that Secretary Tillerson, Secretary Mattis and 
later President Trump himself confirmed America’s pledge to preserve NATO’s collective 
defense).
30 “I am all for engagement, but we also have to recognize reality and what Russia is up to. And there is 
a decreasing number areas where we can engage cooperatively and an increasing number of areas where we 
are going to have to confront Russia.” [34: 45]
31 Ranking Member of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee Adam Smith recalled saying to Gen. Mattis 
before his confirmation: “Trump has no idea what he’s doing but isn’t afraid to do it. You’re across the river, 
and they’re across the hall. […] Your job is to make sure these morons don’t get up in the morning and 
advance some lamebrained idea.” [35]
32 In his Senate confirmation hearing, Gen. Mattis was asked whether he would support additional sanctions 
against Russia, to which he said: “I would like to get with the new national security team, craft a strategy to 
confront Russia for what it has done.” [34: 125]
33 According to the Trump Administration’s 2017 national security strategy, “changes in a regional balance 
of power can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests. […] China and Russia aspire to project 
power worldwide, but they interact most with their neighbors. […] The United States must marshal the will 
and capabilities to compete and prevent unfavorable shifts in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle 
East.” [12: 45]
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Firstly, this request from Washington is not new at all. Two of the most notable examples 
for this under the Obama Administration were the farewell remarks of former Secretary of 
Defense Robert M. Gates in June 2011, and President Obama’s remarks after the NATO 
summit in July 2016. Secondly, the novelty of the message’s style presumably had a purpose, 
as President Trump’s threat of decreasing American commitment to NATO was partially 
echoed by Secretary Mattis34 who has kept the alliance in higher regard. The rationale behind 
this notion was to increase pressure on allies so that they would increase their respective 
defense budgets they had agreed upon after 2014 at a faster pace, and ultimately to strengthen 
NATO. This idea was also incorporated in the Trump Administration’s 2017 U.S. national 
security strategy, along with the concrete priority goal of having the allies reach their national 
defense budgets’ threshold of 2% of GDP (with 20% of that focused on military capability 
development) by 2024 as opposed to the Obama Administration’s 2015 national security 
strategy which emphasized U.S. commitment to Article 5 and cited some of the specific 
measures Washington had taken to help allies against Russia but did not really address their 
responsibility in this matter.35 Thus in short, the Trump Administration’s tactic of rhetorically 
wavering U.S. loyalty to Article 5 has actually been aimed at strengthening the alliance 
to which Washington’s commitment in practical terms has remained.36 Another example 
for the latter is the Trump Administration’s increasing focus on the European Deterrence 
Initiative, formerly known as European Reassurance Initiative. Both “versions” have served 
the purpose of increasing U.S. military presence in Central and Eastern Europe via rotations, 
joint international exercises, trainings, and the enhanced infrastructure and pre-positioning 
of military equipment. The Trump Administration continued to boost these efforts: whereas 
the administration’s EDI budget request for 2018 was $4.8 billion (a $1.4 billion increase 
compared to 2017), the request for 2019 grew further to $6.5 billion. Most of these funds 
are intended for the U.S. Army’s intensified presence in Europe with an episodic and less 
predictable pattern and an increased number of equipment and vehicles (such as M1A2 
Abrams main battle tanks, Patriot missiles, armored multi-purpose vehicles and Bradley 
fighting vehicles). According to the plans, the Army’s pre-positioned equipment in Europe 
should be fully prepared by 2020 when more dynamic deployments with increased troop 
numbers can take place. [39]
34 At the February 2017 meeting of NATO’s Defense Ministers, Secretary Mattis said: “If your nations do not 
want to see America moderate its commitment to this alliance, each of your capitals needs to show support for 
our common defense.” [36] Although this quote did leave its mark in international media, the U.S. Secretary 
also indicated that the hinted scenario was one that he would not speculate more upon: “I’d prefer not to 
[elaborate more about the word «moderate»] because basically that is the headline I do not anticipate ever 
seeing. […] And I’m very confident that we will not have to have that. Sometimes you say the things you 
don’t want to have happen so that you head them off.” [37]
35 Furthermore whereas the 2015 document noted that “NATO is stronger and more cohesive than at any point 
in its history, especially due to contributions of the Nordic countries and newer members like Poland and 
the Baltic countries”, [5: 7] the 2017 strategy emphasizes that NATO “will become stronger when all members 
assume greater responsibility for and pay their fair share to protect our mutual interests, sovereignty, and 
values”. [12: 48]
36 In June 2017, President Trump presented the issue the following way: “I have been an advocate for 
strengthening our NATO Alliance through greater responsibility and burden-sharing among member 
nations. […] I’m committing the United States to Article 5. And certainly we are there to protect. And that’s 
one of the reasons that I want people to make sure we have a very, very strong force by paying the kind of 
money necessary to have that force.” [38]
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Another form of deterrence measures is to be found in U.S. nuclear power. Already 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign, Donald Trump said that the Obama 
and Medvedev Administrations’ 2010 bilateral strategic nuclear arms reduction agreement 
known as the New START Treaty left the United States in a disadvantageous position 
compared to Russia with the latter increasing its nuclear arsenal.37 The 2017 U.S. national 
security strategy declared that “nuclear armed adversaries have expanded their arsenals 
and range of delivery systems” [12: 30] which was later confirmed by the 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR) specifically naming Russia and China in this regard. [41: 2] Although 
the latter document does not represent a harsh break from the Obama Administration’s 2010 
NPR, including the support for the aforementioned New START Treaty, [41: 73] it does 
have an increased focus on catching up with Russia in certain capabilities. Specifically, 
the report highlights that Russia achieved an advantage in non-strategic nuclear weapons 
as well as their delivery capabilities that do not fall under the regulation of the New START 
Treaty but do violate other agreements, most notably the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty. [41: 9] Moreover, Russia increased its reliance on these systems and decided 
to follow an “escalate to de-escalate doctrine” by which it opens the possibility of limited 
nuclear first use in a conflict assuming that this escalation will not lead to Western retaliation 
but to “capitulation on terms favorable to Moscow”. [41: 30] Accordingly, the document 
calls for U.S. countermeasures that are compliant with existing arms limitation treaties but 
balance Russian non-strategic nuclear build-up at the same time, for example by introducing 
a submarine launched cruise missile along with a low-yield warhead. On the one hand, this 
move would serve as a deterrent against Russia’s utilization of its aforementioned doctrine 
[42] while on the other, it could also put pressure on Moscow to return to the INF Treaty. 
In a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee shortly after the publication of 
the 2018 NPR, Secretary Mattis said that the initiative is intended to set U.S. diplomats 
“negotiating from a position of strength” with the aforementioned weapon systems 
functioning as potential bargaining chips.38 [43] The issue of nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems has been one of the “hot spots” in U.S.–Russian quarrels throughout the last 
decade or so. Most recently, Vladimir Putin announced the development of a nuclear armed 
intercontinental missile that would allegedly penetrate any defense system. Reciting earlier 
complaints of American missile defense efforts hindering Russian security,39 President Putin 
criticized current U.S. nuclear policy, as well. [45] While President Trump was less vocal on 
the subject, only calling the announcement “irresponsible”, [46] the case did not improve his 
37 During his debate with presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in October 2016, Donald Trump 
complained: “Take a look at the ‘start up’ that [President Obama and President Medvedev] signed. 
The Russians […] create warheads, and we can’t. […] We’re in very serious trouble, because we have 
a country with tremendous numbers of nuclear warheads […] where they expanded and we didn’t. […] And 
[Hillary Clinton is] playing chicken.” [40]
38 Secretary Mattis added: “I want to make certain that our negotiators have something to negotiate with, that we 
want Russia back into compliance. We do not want to forgo the INF [Treaty], but at the same time we have 
options if Russia continues to go down this path.” [43]
39 Despite the accomplishments of the Obama Administration “reset” policy, particularly the 2010 New START 
Treaty, Russia has vowed to counter U.S./NATO missile defense efforts in Central and Eastern Europe by 
developing its nuclear capabilities, defense and delivery systems in parallel to the advancement of the United 
States’ missile defense program, as announced by former Russian President Dmitry A. Medvedev in 
November 2011. [44]
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stance towards President Putin whose remarks could have been understood as a challenge of 
the U.S. President’s strength. [47]
American efforts of stepping up against Russia are also enhanced through more direct 
engagement with frontier states as well. The need for containment measures was indicated 
in 2016 by policy analysts Jakub Grygiel and Wess A. Mitchell, the latter of whom became 
Assistant Secretary of State at the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs in the Trump 
Administration. The two scholars argued that in the time of intensified competition with 
revisionist powers, America should refocus its attention on alliances on the frontiers 
[48: 50] where “well-armed allies […] are a strategic blessing for the United States […] by 
becoming hardened obstacles [for the expansion efforts of revisionist powers]”. [48: 55] In 
accordance, the Trump Administration has moved forward with arms sales to Poland and 
Romania, the larger European frontline states,40 and has indicated that it would ease U.S. 
international arms sales in general. [49] This departure from the Obama Administration’s 
considerations revealed a major novelty of the Trump Administration’s policy on dealing 
with Russian aggression in December 2017: namely, its blessing for arming Ukraine with 
lethal weapons. Such a move has been long in the making. The Ukrainian Government had 
approached the Obama Administration to request lethal weapons, and although this idea was 
pushed forward by some in Congress and advisors of President Obama, he declined out of 
fear that providing these weapons to Ukraine would only help to escalate the conflict and 
would ultimately hurt the Ukrainians (and allied cohesion) more than it would hurt Russia.41 
Administration officials also fought to convince President Trump of the move with James 
Mattis and Rex Tillerson supporting the initiative that would enhance the already provided 
nonlethal arms (such as body armor, radars, radios and vehicles) with Javelin anti-tank 
missiles and sniper rifles. An important part of the Trump Administration’s rationale is that 
although these arms are lethal, they are still defensive in nature, meaning that they are only 
intended to improve the Ukrainians’ position against their adversaries, establishing a balance 
between them and thus make Russian efforts of further aggression more expensive.42 [51] 
This is what Jakub Grygiel and Wess Mitchell have described—in the case of allies—as 
“deterrence by denial” which in their words “involves the development of capabilities that 
hinder the enemy’s military advance by increasing the costs of territorial expansion and 
control”. [48: 55] Furthermore, the potentially increasing expenses of Russian military 
40 It is by no accident that President Trump’s first heads of state level meetings within Central and Eastern 
Europe were with the respective presidents of Poland and Romania in the summer of 2017.
41 As Anthony J. Blinken, Deputy National Security Advisor (2013–2015) and Deputy Secretary of State 
(2015–2017) to President Obama noted in October 2017: “Proponents [of lethal aid ban under the Obama 
administration] argued that any military escalation favored Moscow, for whom the stakes were higher and 
the ability to quickly pour more lethal weapons into Ukraine much greater. They were concerned Ukraine 
would be emboldened to act out militarily and overplay its hand. They knew that Moscow sought to divide 
us from our European partners, most of whom opposed lethal aid. President Barack Obama concluded that 
we should keep the focus where we had the advantage: on tough sanctions, economic aid to Ukraine, training 
for its troops, support for its reform efforts—especially combating endemic corruption—and determined 
diplomacy.” [50]
42 As Ukrainian President Petro O. Poroshenko pointed out in the summer of 2017: “Any defensive weapons 
would be just to increase the price if Russia makes a decision to attack my troops and my territory.” [51]
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adventures can also contribute to the advancement of the peace process in Ukraine.43 The case 
again reveals the Trump Administration’s general view that “peace through strength” offers 
a more viable path to engaging with Russia.
Conclusion
While President Trump’s foreign policy is usually viewed as controversial, it does show 
consistency in itself and partially with that of President Obama regarding Russia. Differing 
world views between the United States and Russia have already existed during the Obama 
Administration with the White House visioning a cooperation-oriented multi-partner world, 
and the Kremlin believing in a competition-based multi-polar one. By the end of President 
Obama’s term in office it became clear that Russian aggression significantly affected major 
power relations of the future.
The Trump Administration is even more outspoken and vocal in this regard. Its official 
national security policy documents are testimonies of a competition-based mindset 
according to which the world is a global arena where the United States faces great powers 
as rivals. Accordingly, there’s a contest of power with Russia (and China) manifesting in 
the geopolitics of several regions in the world. In addition to these declarations, the major 
foreign policy decision-making actors within the Trump Administration advocate a firm 
stance against Russia, as well. All of this has manifested in not only the maintenance of 
Obama-era initiatives countering Russian aggression but in their qualitative enhancement in 
Europe, as well.
The Trump Administration’s world view and concept of “peace through strength” suggest 
that President Trump’s personal tendencies of trying to get along with Russia are only examples 
of the already seen initial U.S. presidential efforts of reaching out to Moscow for the sake of 
mutually beneficial cooperation, and that they are largely outweighed by his administration’s 
awareness of the realities of great power competition—now openly declared on both sides. 
Given these conditions, a rapprochement with Russia under the Trump Administration is in 
fact more unlikely than before.
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